“Who controls Hormuz?”… Strikes in Larak, Jordan, and Al-Manhad reveal the limits of American and Iranian control

Abu Dhabi, UAE – Between Washington’s declaration of complete control over the Strait of Hormuz and Tehran’s insistence on maintaining control, the strikes on the Iranian positions in Larak, Jordan, and Al-Manhad reveal that the battle is no longer solely about the strait itself, but rather about the ability to disrupt or protect maritime traffic, and who truly holds the power to decide the passage of ships. The Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely a maritime passage between Iran and Oman; in the latest round of escalation, it has become a practical test of the limits of American and Iranian power. Washington asserts its ability to protect navigation and prevent Iran from closing the strait, while Tehran insists on possessing the means to disrupt traffic within it. However, the recent strikes raise a more complex question: Does control of Hormuz equate to the ability to use it, or the ability to deny it to others?

The Strait of Hormuz: Why are Iran and America vying for control?

Washington declared it had “complete control” of the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran rejected the American narrative and asserted its ability to control maritime traffic. However, military control does not necessarily equate to maritime control, and the ability to threaten ships does not equate to the ability to manage global trade. The strait lies geographically between Iran and Oman and is subject to an international legal regime that guarantees the right of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation, as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore, any power’s declaration of “ownership” of Hormuz does not constitute legal ownership of the waterway.

Lark Island: Why did America strike an Iranian site near Hormuz?

On August 30, US forces struck Iran’s Larak Island, targeting two launch pads that Washington said the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was preparing to use to fire missiles carrying naval mines toward the Strait of Hormuz. According to Reuters, the strike was the first known US attack on Iran since late July. The significance of the strike lies not only in the location of Larak but also in the nature of the target: the potential to disrupt maritime traffic. In other words, Washington did not strike the Strait of Hormuz itself, but rather targeted one of the tools that could make its use more dangerous, thus shifting the concept of control from territorial control to control of maritime navigation.

Jordan and Al-Manhad: Why did the Iranian response come from the Strait of Hormuz?

Following the Larak strike, the Iranian response was not on the island itself. The Revolutionary Guard announced it had targeted US military sites in Jordan, while Jordanian authorities said they intercepted eight missiles that entered their airspace. Tehran then announced it had targeted the Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE with drones, but this account still requires independent confirmation regarding the extent of the damage and casualties.

The strategic implication is clear: the battle for Hormuz is no longer confined to the strait itself. Iran is responding to the American network of deployments outside the strait, while Washington is striking sites it deems linked to threats to navigation. Thus, military bases in the region, even those located far from the strait, become part of the equation for controlling this vital waterway.

From Lark to the Gulf: How did geography become a weapon?

In the previous investigation, the question was: How did geography become a weapon? Now, the question is: Who has the power to define geography as “under control”? The Lark strike suggests that Washington sees certain Iranian sites as a direct extension of the threat to the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the response to the Jordan and Al-Manhad strikes indicates that Tehran views American bases in the region as another extension of the conflict. Thus, Hormuz is no longer just a point on a map, but a network of military, naval, and economic sites.

Commercial ships: The real test of control over the Strait of Hormuz

There is one criterion that neither Washington nor Tehran seems to be setting: commercial shipping. If the United States controls the Strait of Hormuz, and if Iran controls it, the real test is how many ships can transit it safely and consistently. Recent reports indicate that commercial shipping traffic through the strait has declined sharply, with only a limited number of vessels passing through during the recent escalation. While the reported figures may be lower than the actual traffic, as some ships may have disabled their tracking systems to minimize risk, the strait may not be officially closed, but it is commercially abnormal. This is a crucial point: control that cannot guarantee the flow of trade does not necessarily equate to actual control of the waterway.

Is the Strait of Hormuz truly open or closed due to dangers?

International law grants ships the right of innocent passage through international straits, but shipping companies don’t base their decisions solely on the law. Mines, missiles, drones, insurance, crew safety, and the cost of the voyage all play a role. Therefore, a strait may be legally open, but in practice, it becomes a high-risk passage. Iran may not need to completely close the Strait of Hormuz to impact trade; it is enough to make passage through it more dangerous and expensive. Similarly, the United States doesn’t need to control every inch of the strait to influence shipping; it is enough to have the capability to protect the shipping lanes and eliminate the main threats.

International law: Who has the right of passage through the Strait of Hormuz?

Article 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates the right of innocent passage for ships and aircraft through straits used for international navigation. The International Maritime Organization has also emphasized the importance of protecting freedom of navigation in international straits and not obstructing or suspending it. Therefore, the legal question is not whether Iran or the United States controls the Strait of Hormuz, but rather whether any power can prevent the right of passage guaranteed by international law. Here, the reality of navigation becomes more important than military pronouncements.

20 million barrels… Why does the Strait of Hormuz scare the oil markets?

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has historically estimated oil and petroleum product flows through it at around 20 million barrels per day, representing roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquid consumption. Therefore, the repercussions of any disruption to navigation in the Gulf don’t remain confined to the region; they quickly spread to: oil → insurance → shipping → markets → energy prices globally. In this context, a military strike on an island like Larak can have an impact far exceeding the size of the target itself.

Controlling the Strait of Hormuz: Four equations that go beyond military force

Recent developments reveal that the word “control” used in American and Iranian discourse masks four equations:

Military dominance: Who can strike the other side?

Disruption capability: Who can make passage dangerous or impossible?

Protection capability: Who can secure ships and eliminate threats?

Economic and psychological control: Who can force shipping and insurance companies to change their decisions?

Thus, the picture is not a simple simplistic one. Iran may possess a greater capacity for threatening and disrupting, while the United States has greater capabilities for protection and countering such disruptions. However, it seems unlikely that either side can single-handedly guarantee a return to normal navigation through a mere political declaration.

Who can keep the Strait of Hormuz open?

If Washington can clear mines and secure shipping lanes, but cannot restore normal transit rates, its claim to control will remain incomplete. Similarly, if Iran can threaten shipping and reduce maritime traffic, but cannot impose a complete closure of the Strait, its claim to total control will also remain incomplete. Therefore, the stronger party is not necessarily the one that can close the Strait of Hormuz or launch more missiles, but rather the one that can influence maritime traffic at the lowest cost and for the longest period.

Lark, Jordan, and Al-Minhad… three blows in one battle

The final blows can be read as episodes in a single equation:

Lark: Washington is targeting a potential Iranian capability to threaten navigation.

Jordan: Iran strikes a point in the American deployment network outside the Strait.

Al-Minhad: Iran, according to its announcement, is expanding the scope of targeting the American military presence in the Gulf.

Thus, the question shifts from: Who controls Hormuz? to: Who can expand the war around Hormuz without losing control of its repercussions?

“Hormuz is not owned by anyone,” but everyone pays the price for it.

Perhaps the greatest paradox is that while the United States and Iran possess the means to exert influence in the Strait of Hormuz, neither can afford to ignore the other players. These include Iran, the United States, Oman, and the Gulf states, as well as shipping and insurance companies, energy-importing nations, and global markets. Therefore, the Strait of Hormuz is not merely an arena for Iranian-American confrontation, but rather a vital international system of navigation, energy, and trade.

Who actually owns the Strait of Hormuz?

The recent strikes have offered a different answer to the political rhetoric. Iran possesses the means to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States possesses the means to protect navigation and counter those disruptions. However, the party that succeeds in ensuring the safe and continuous passage of ships is closer to effectively controlling the strait. Therefore, the true indicator of the next round will not be the number of missiles launched, nor the number of bases targeted, but rather the number of ships transiting Hormuz. If traffic returns to normal, Washington can claim success in protecting the strait. If ships remain at rest, even without a formal closure, Tehran can assert its ability to impose costs on shipping. But if traffic collapses further, neither Iran nor the United States will have “controlled” Hormuz; the war itself will have taken control.

Here the question that started from Lark becomes more serious: if the American strike targeted the ability to disrupt Hormuz, and the Iranian response targeted the network of American presence around it, then where will be the next testing point for control of the strait? Because in this round, Hormuz is no longer just a strait; it is a measure of power, and every ship that crosses it has become a number in the balance of war.