“Iran Is Not Striking Israel”—Has the War’s Objective Changed?

Abu Dhabi, UAE – At a moment when the Middle East appears closer to a widespread regional conflagration, the most significant paradox in Iran’s behavior is that it is not making Israel the primary target of its direct military response—even though the conflict originally began with US and Israeli strikes targeting Iran and its military and nuclear facilities.

However, an analysis of Iranian moves in recent days reveals that the issue may not be so much a refusal to fight as a redefinition of the battlefield. Iran’s currently declared objectives center on restoring deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners, undermining Washington’s capacity to sustain the war, and securing recognition of Iran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz, alongside an attempt to drive a wedge between the United States, Israel, and Arab nations. Israel does not appear to be the sole—or even the central—target in this equation.

From “Striking Israel” to “Raising the Cost of War”

Over the past few decades, Iran has built a significant portion of its regional security around the concept of “forward defense”—keeping front lines far from Iranian territory through a network of allies and armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Gaza. However, the 2026 war exposed the limitations of this model. A recent study in the journal *Small Wars & Insurgencies* suggests that the events of 2023–2025 revealed vulnerabilities in Iran’s proxy-based deterrence, while a Chatham House study concluded that the “forward defense” policy had effectively backfired on Tehran, leading to the very direct confrontation it had historically sought to avoid. Consequently, the central question for Iran appears to have shifted from “How do we strike Israel?” to “How do we make the continuation of the war more costly for the party that started it?” It is in this context that U.S. and Gulf objectives—along with energy interests and maritime corridors—come into play.

Israel might be the “trap,” not the target.

Any major, direct Iranian strike on Israel could provide Tel Aviv with a justification to expand the scope of the war into Iranian territory. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has explicitly warned that any Iranian attack on Israel would release the country from the self-imposed constraints it currently observes, threatening strikes against Iran’s military, civilian, and energy infrastructure. This dynamic distinguishes a direct Iranian strike on Israel from attacks on U.S. bases or actions targeting war-related economic interests. In the former scenario, Israel could frame escalation as a direct response to an attack on its own soil. In the latter, however, the costs of the conflict would be distributed among the United States, its allies, and various regional and international economic interests—thereby complicating Washington’s decision on whether to continue the confrontation.

Iran plays on the “distance” between Washington and Tel Aviv.

The Institute for the Study of War report released on September 8 identifies four goals for the Iranian campaign: recognizing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, reducing US capacity and willingness to continue the war, restoring deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its partners, and trying to separate the United States and Israel from the Arab states. These goals reveal an important shift. Iran does not necessarily need to destroy Israel in order to say that it has regained its deterrence capacity; It is enough, according to this logic, to make Washington pay an increasing political, economic and military price, and to prevent the formation of a unified regional front against it. Here, striking Israel becomes a possible means and not necessarily the ultimate goal.

“Horizontal War” Instead of Vertical Confrontation

The new equation can be described as “horizontal warfare”: expanding the scope of costs incurred rather than simply intensifying the strike against a single target. Iran possesses a range of tools to achieve this—from missiles and drones to exerting pressure on infrastructure, energy supplies, and maritime corridors, alongside its network of regional allies. Houthi actions against Saudi oil facilities on September 8 provided a clear example of this mindset; the Institute for the Study of War observes that the group shifted from targeting ships to targeting “economic arteries” after it became evident that a naval blockade alone had failed to achieve its objectives. This is crucial for understanding Iranian behavior itself: when pressure on a direct target fails, the battle can be shifted to the economic and political costs associated with that target.

Why is Hormuz more important than Tel Aviv right now?

The Strait of Hormuz offers Tehran a strategic card that a direct strike on Israel does not; the Strait handles approximately one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, meaning any prolonged disruption there would impose costs extending far beyond Iran and Israel to the global economy—yet the problem is that this card has begun to lose some of its potency.

Reuters reported on September 6 that Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage has diminished as markets have adapted and some supplies have been rerouted to alternative paths, while U.S. blockades and sanctions have strained Iran’s revenues and access to foreign currency. Consequently, Tehran does not appear to want to close the strait indefinitely; a total shutdown would harm its adversaries but would also jeopardize one of its most important economic tools. The most advantageous scenario for Iran is to maintain the strait as a source of leverage that can be escalated without necessarily triggering an all-out naval war.

The economy has become part of deterrence.

Under the pressure of sanctions and a naval blockade, Iran faces a mounting economic crisis characterized by declining oil exports, foreign currency shortages, rising prices, and a reduced capacity to import. According to Reuters, Iranian officials fear that this economic pressure could trigger renewed domestic unrest; however, such pressure does not necessarily mean Iran will back down. Ironically, the economic crisis itself may drive the Iranian leadership to insist on demonstrating its ability to retaliate, as yielding without securing a political concession could be perceived domestically as a defeat. Tehran thus faces a highly complex equation: it needs to escalate to avoid appearing weak, yet it must simultaneously prevent that escalation from reaching a point that threatens the regime’s survival.

Why does not attacking Israel not mean “helplessness”?

Iran’s missile capabilities have not vanished; on September 8, the Institute for the Study of War noted Iran’s use of the “Qasem Basir” ballistic missile—which has a range of approximately 1,200 kilometers and the ability to maneuver during atmospheric re-entry. Reports also indicate that Iran is gradually shifting its focus from extending missile range to enhancing accuracy, mobility, survivability, and operational flexibility. However, possessing the capability to strike does not mean that doing so is the best option; the dilemma for Tehran lies in the aftermath of such a strike. Were Iran to launch a massive attack on Israel resulting in significant casualties, it might achieve a tactical success, yet it could simultaneously trigger a far more devastating Israeli and American counter-offensive targeting Iran’s military, energy, and command infrastructure. Precisely for this reason, the ability to refrain from using a weapon at the very moment an adversary expects its deployment constitutes a component of deterrence.

Israel holds the advantage of “escalation.”

The history of the confrontation between Iran and Israel reveals that superiority hinges not merely on the number of missiles, but on the ability to control the level of escalation. Various strategic studies have focused on the concept of “escalation dominance”—possessing the capacity to raise the intensity of a confrontation to a level the adversary cannot easily match. Specialized analyses suggest that, at numerous stages of the conflict, Israel has maintained a greater capacity to transition from limited strikes to targeting leadership, as well as military and nuclear infrastructure. In this context, a direct Iranian strike on Israel represents a strategic risk far greater than the mere launching of missiles; Tehran is not facing a solitary target, but rather a complex system comprising Israel, the United States, U.S. bases, air defense networks, and regional partners.

“Forward defense” is no longer working as it used to.

The most critical shift for Iran is that the deterrence network it spent years building no longer serves its original purpose; a Chatham House study suggests that the “Axis of Resistance”—intended to keep confrontation away from Iran—has failed to prevent direct war and has instead contributed to dragging the country into it. Similarly, the Middle East Institute observes that the historical experience of the Iran-Iraq War instilled a conviction among Iranian decision-makers that the nation cannot withstand an open, direct confrontation with the United States and Israel. This explains why Tehran may be moving toward a new form of deterrence that does not rely on a “major strike,” but rather on distributing risks and raising the cost of war across multiple fronts.

Silence regarding Israel may be a message.

In warfare, a strike is not the only form of message; sometimes, refraining from a strike sends a message as well. If Israel anticipates a direct Iranian response that fails to materialize at the expected scale, intelligence and political calculations shift. Similarly, if the United States prepares for a potential Iranian strike on Israel but Tehran selects a different target, Iran effectively forces its adversary to spread its forces, resources, and attention across multiple contingencies. This does not necessarily signal a successful strategy, but it does afford Tehran room to maneuver.

The waiting game comes at a price.

However, the “wait-and-see” strategy is not without risk; the longer the conflict drags on, the greater the economic pressure on Iran becomes, and its ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage diminishes as the United States and its allies adapt to the pattern of Iranian attacks. Reuters has cited analysts noting that while Tehran is banking on its ability to withstand economic pain, it simultaneously faces the risk that this war of attrition could turn into a domestic burden—manifesting in rising prices, goods shortages, and currency depreciation. Consequently, Iran does not have the luxury of an endless war.

The New Iranian Equation

Iran’s current behavior can be summarized by an equation that differs from previous years: do not strike Israel if the cost entails opening a major front inside Iran, but strike targets that raise the cost of war for the United States and its allies—without giving Israel a blank check for escalation. This equation explains why Iran appears simultaneously more escalatory in the Gulf and less inclined toward a broad, direct confrontation with Israel. It has not abandoned the view of Israel as an adversary, but it may be shifting its focus from destroying the target to altering the adversary’s calculations.

Has the goal of the war changed?

Perhaps the most significant answer is that Iran no longer views the war as a bilateral confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv; in Iran’s current calculus, the conflict appears more like a contest over who can dictate the cost of continuing hostilities. If Tehran succeeds in convincing the United States that the war’s continuation threatens its bases, interests, global energy supplies, and Arab allies, it may achieve part of its objective—even without delivering a major blow to Israel.

However, if it fails to translate this cost into a political concession—and if sanctions continue to strangle its economy—it may find itself facing the very option it has sought all along to avoid: shifting from a calculated war of attrition to a direct confrontation with an unpredictable outcome. Thus, the real question is no longer “Why doesn’t Iran strike Israel?” but rather: “Has the strike Tehran *refrains* from launching sometimes become more dangerous than the missile it actually fires?”