Bamako, Mali – In a complex landscape that blends ethnic nationalism with transnational jihadist ideology, Iyad Ag Ghali, also known as Abu al-Fadl, has emerged as the most dangerous man in the Sahel region of Africa. Ag Ghali is no longer merely the leader of a terrorist organization; he is now seen as the architect of a comprehensive “war of attrition” strategy aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the ruling military junta in Bamako, led by Assimi Goïta, using a combination of asymmetric military operations and crippling economic warfare.
According to strategic analyses by experts and analysts interviewed by Voice of Emirates the new strategy pursued by Iyad Ag Ghali culminated in coordinated attacks that began on the morning of Saturday, April 25, 2026. The capital, Bamako, and the cities of Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Kati witnessed fierce strikes carried out by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) in alliance with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). This alliance represents a radical shift, as the aspirations of the northern separatists converge with al-Qaeda’s agenda to destabilize the entire Malian state.
The path of transformations: from “rebellion” to “emirate”
Iyad Ag Ghali’s trajectory reflects the turmoil in Mali over the past three decades. He began as a Tuareg rebel leader in the 1990s before turning to extremism and founding Ansar Dine. He then became the emir of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s branch in the Sahel, which was formed in 2017 through the merger of several factions, most notably the Macina Battalion. Today, Ag Ghali leads operations that go beyond traditional ambushes to include the use of drones, which he personally oversees, exploiting the security vacuum left by the withdrawal of French forces (Operation Barkhane) and the UN mission (MINUSMA).
Economic warfare and the “siege” tactic
Chadian political analyst Djibrine Issa believes that the most significant shift in Iyad Ag Ghali’s strategy began in September 2025 with the implementation of “economic warfare.” He adopted the tactic of blockading the main roads connecting the capital, Bamako, to the city of Kayes, targeting fuel convoys and vital supplies. Issa asserts that the objective was not to immediately seize the capital, but rather to “strangle the state” and drive up prices to undermine the legitimacy of the military junta and portray it as incapable of protecting citizens’ livelihoods. These operations were financed through networks of kidnapping, extortion, and illicit trade.
This strategy represents a shift from “traditional armed jihad” to a political ambition aimed at presenting the group as an alternative to central authority, by providing basic services and “selective” security in rural areas where government presence is absent.
Contradictions of the alliance and refusal to negotiate
According to publications by the Al-Zallaqa Foundation, the media wing of the organization, Ag Ghali rejects any negotiations with the military council, which he describes as “traitorous” and allied with “Russian proxies” (the former Wagner Group/African Legion).
However, Mohamed Ali Kilani, director of the Sahel Observatory, warns that Ag Ghali is committing “repeated strategic errors” regarding the Azawad cause. Kilani points out that Ag Ghali’s attempt to replicate the experiences of Afghanistan or Syria in the Sahel by imposing a “separatist state” that would become a breeding ground for terrorism is a risky gamble that could transform the region into an endless conflict zone.
Deco as a compromise… and Ag Ghali as an “outlier” character
For his part, former Mauritanian intelligence officer Ahmed Mbarek believes that Ag Ghali no longer possesses the qualities of a “consensus figure,” even for the Azawad themselves. Mbarek describes the current coordination between jihadists and separatists as a “temporary arrangement” dictated by shared interests and hostility towards the Goïta regime.
Mbarek puts forward the name of Imam Mahmoud Dicko as the only figure capable of playing a unifying role in Mali. Dicko, nicknamed “the imam who topples presidents,” enjoys a massive popular base in Bamako and has origins that combine Fulani and Bambara heritage with ties to the Azawad region, making him acceptable to various opposition factions, unlike Ag Ghali, who has moved towards the most extreme currents.
gradual fragmentation of power
In an analysis of the situation, Italian strategic consultant Daniele Ruffinetti told Voice of Emirates website that Ag Ghali is not seeking to win the war through traditional means, but rather is reshaping the political landscape of the conflict. Ruffinetti added: “His strategy combines attrition and decentralization; instead of concentrating forces, he distributes them across a flexible network that exhausts the Malian army and renders it incapable of extending its influence beyond the major cities.”
Rofinetti continues: “What we are witnessing is a hybrid insurgency aimed at the gradual erosion of state authority. The coordination between jihadists and Tuareg factions reflects a high degree of pragmatism that increases the pressure on the military junta and its external allies.”
He concludes that while it is unlikely that Ag Ghali will seize Bamako entirely, he is already succeeding in “marginalizing the state” in large parts of the country, establishing a new reality where control is defined by actual presence on the ground, not by formal sovereignty.
Faced with this reality, Mali remains stuck between a military council trying to prove its sovereignty by force of arms and Russian support, and an “engineer of attrition” betting on time and dismantling the joints of the state from within, putting the future of the country and the entire region at stake.
