“Disengagement 710″… 1.86 million Palestinians… Who will open the way out?

Abu Dhabi, UAE – The “Disengagement 710” plan proposed by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir is no longer merely a political concept regarding what Israel calls “voluntary emigration” from the Gaza Strip; it has transformed into a concrete project with specific figures. Furthermore, it includes proposed funding, travel and reception protocols, and the goal of removing approximately 1.86 million Palestinians within seven years.

But behind these figures lies a fundamental gap: Where will these people come from? And who will receive them? The plan speaks of 250,000 people leaving in the first year, 1.11 million over three years, and then 1.86 million over seven years, with visas, housing, training, employment, and financial support provided to those leaving. However, achieving these goals does not depend solely on an Israeli decision. Because every person leaving Gaza ultimately needs an exit route and a country that will accept them and grant them legal status. This is where the real crux of the “Disengagement 710” plan begins.

“Separation 710″… A massive plan on paper

The plan envisions a government system to manage “voluntary migration,” with initial Israeli funding estimated at around 10 billion shekels and a funding framework that could reach 50 billion shekels with international participation. The system would cover travel costs, initial accommodation, training, employment, and support for those leaving, potentially lasting up to 24 months, along with incentives or payments to receiving countries and organizations. However, money alone does not solve the fundamental problem. Even with the budget available, a receiving country willing to accept these individuals and grant them legal status remains essential. Therefore, despite its substantial figures, the plan relies on decisions made outside of Israel.

The host country… the most difficult part

The plan presented various countries as possible destinations, including Türkiye, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Arab countries, with talk of pathways linked to work, education, treatment and family reunification. But presenting a country as a “potential destination” does not mean that it has agreed to receive large numbers of Gazans. This point is one of the most important practical gaps in the project. If the goal is to expel 1.86 million people within seven years, what is required is not just opening the door to travel. Rather, it also requires building an international reception system capable of providing accommodation, work, services, and legal status for hundreds of thousands. To date, there is no declared approval from a country to receive this number according to the “Separation 710” project.

Rafah… the gate whose key is not solely held by Israel.

Egypt’s importance is amplified by geography. The Gaza Strip is connected to Egypt by land via the Rafah crossing, making any large-scale evacuation by land contingent on the Egyptian side and its security and political arrangements. The Rafah crossing was reopened in 2016 on a limited basis, as part of ceasefire arrangements. This is fundamentally different from establishing a permanent corridor for the exit of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and this is where the “Egyptian equation” within the 710 disengagement plan comes into play. The question is not simply: Will Egypt accept the displacement of Palestinians? But rather: Can a plan of this scale even function without an exit route through Egypt? The practical answer depends on the existence of a genuine alternative, not merely a political declaration.

Sea and air… the mysterious alternative

Israel has already begun proposing alternatives to the land route. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Israel is prepared to facilitate the departure of Gaza residents “by all possible means,” including by sea and air, but he linked this to obtaining American approval. This raises a new question: Does “Disengagement 710” actually possess the operational infrastructure to allow for the evacuation of hundreds of thousands by sea and air, or are these options still merely political concepts? Sea and air transport is not simply a matter of replacing a bus with a ship or plane. A departure point, security arrangements, transportation, transit countries (if necessary), and a destination country that grants legal status to those leaving are all required. In other words, the fundamental problem will remain, even if the means of transport change.

700 people a day… Is it feasible?

The figures themselves reveal the scale of the challenge: 250,000 people leaving Gaza in a single year equates to an average of approximately 685 people per day. Reaching 1.86 million people over seven years translates to an average of nearly 726 people per day throughout that period. This is not merely a statistic; it signifies the continuous operation of a system for border crossings, transportation, security screening, visa processing, reception, and residency, at a high daily rate, for years. The question then becomes more specific: Is there even an international system in place to legally and systematically facilitate the departure of more than 700 people from Gaza daily and their reception outside the Strip? To date, there is no publicly available answer confirming the existence of such a system.

Trump: The approval Israel needs

Israel cannot ignore the American factor in this matter. US President Donald Trump previously floated ideas for relocating Gaza’s population to other countries, proposals that were met with widespread Arab and international rejection. Today, Israeli officials are reviving the idea of ​​removing the population, but implementing a large-scale operation requires American political backing, especially if it involves the use of sea or air, or regional arrangements that extend beyond Israel’s borders. Conversely, official American positions emphasize the rejection of forced displacement, stressing that those who leave Gaza should be able to return. This raises one of the most sensitive points of the plan: when is “migration” truly voluntary, and when do the conditions surrounding war, destruction, and displacement become a compelling factor for residents to leave?

Who holds the key to “Separation 710”?

When tracing the journey of a single individual within the plan, the picture changes entirely. The route begins in Gaza, then proceeds to the point of departure, followed by inspection, then the crossing, port, or airport, then the means of transport, and perhaps a transit country, then the destination country, the visa, residency, work, education, or medical treatment. Each stage of this journey falls under the authority of a different entity. Israel can define the destination and finance part of the process. However, it cannot unilaterally issue a visa to another country, compel a country to accept migrants, open an Egyptian crossing, or guarantee residency rights in a third country. Here, Ben-Gvir’s plan transforms from an Israeli project into a multilateral international network.

The problem isn’t with the first million… it’s with the first person.

The equation of 1.86 million Palestinians may seem to be the main issue, but the real test of the plan begins long before that. Where will the first person go? Who will agree to receive him? Who will grant him a visa? Who will pay for his transportation? Who will guarantee his accommodation? Who will provide him with work or education? Who will guarantee his right of return? If there is no practical and declared answer to these questions, then the large numbers remain political goals rather than an implementable program.

“Separation 710”: A plan searching for a gateway

A logistical reading of the plan reveals that the problem lies not in Israel’s ability to determine the numbers or allocate the funds, but rather in the process that begins outside its borders. “Disengagement 710” requires receiving countries, exit routes, border arrangements, international approvals, and a legal framework to determine the fate of those leaving. Egypt represents a major obstacle on the land route. The United States is a decisive player in any broad regional arrangements. Meanwhile, the receiving countries remain the most ambiguous link. Therefore, the most important question is no longer: Has Israel devised a plan to remove 1.86 million Palestinians from Gaza? It has become: Who will pave the way for this plan? Israel can determine the number, allocate the funds, and discuss the sea and air routes. But it cannot unilaterally determine the destination. Ultimately, perhaps the biggest flaw in “Disengagement 710” is that the plan knows exactly who it wants to remove, but it still doesn’t know who will open the door for them.