“They don’t need to close it”—how are the Houthis trying to turn Bab al-Mandab into a pressure card against the Suez Canal?

Abu Dhabi, UAE – The recent Houthi advance in Yemen represents more than just a shift in the internal war map; the push to the cities of Mocha and Dhubab, combined with the seizure of Perim Island (Mayun) in the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, has moved the battle to one of the most sensitive points in the global trade and energy network. The critical question is no longer whether the Houthis are capable of completely shutting down the Bab al-Mandab Strait, but rather whether they even need to do so. Experience since 2023 has demonstrated that merely raising the risk level for vessels can compel shipping companies to alter their routes, thereby transforming a localized security crisis into a global cost that ripples from the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and on to European and Asian markets.

The Houthis advance in Yemen: from Mocha to the heart of Bab al-Mandab

The most significant shift on the ground began with the Houthi takeover of the coastal city of Mocha, followed by an advance south toward Dhubab—an area overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait—and finally reaching Mayun Island (also known as Perim), which lies within the strait and divides its shipping lane into two channels. Yemeni government sources confirmed to Reuters the withdrawal of government forces from Mayun and the arrival of Houthi forces there, while the Associated Press noted that seizing Mocha and Mayun placed the group at the heart of a maritime chokepoint vital to the global economy. Other international reports indicate Houthi advances into additional islands and coastal areas; however, details regarding the control of certain islands remain disputed among sources. Thus, the only confirmed developments on the ground are the group’s arrival at Mayun and Dhubab and its seizure of Mocha.

Bab al-Mandab After the Houthi Advance: Why Has Mayun Become the Turning Point?

The importance of Mayun lies in its location rather than its size; situated in the southern Red Sea near the narrowest point of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, controlling the island offers military and geographic value that far exceeds its physical dimensions. Consequently, the Houthis’ shift from the mainland coast to the island alters the strategic equation: the group no longer relies solely on long-range capabilities to threaten vessels but now maintains a physical presence on the ground within the immediate vicinity of the maritime corridor itself. This does not imply that the Houthis have gained full legal control over Bab al-Mandab or that they can close it at will—the strait is an international waterway bordered by two coasts, and maritime traffic does not automatically cease simply because an island has been seized. However, controlling positions overlooking the strait grants the group a greater capacity to issue threats, exert pressure, and drive up the cost of passage.

The Houthis do not need to close Bab al-Mandab.

Here lies the fundamental paradox of the crisis: in the world of maritime transport, a waterway need not be completely closed to trigger a significant economic impact. It suffices for security risks to rise to a level that compels shipping companies to reassess their voyages. This is precisely what occurred during the previous wave of Red Sea attacks; as confidence in the route’s security waned, a substantial portion of shipping traffic was diverted to the Cape of Good Hope—a route that is both longer and more costly. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study revealed that the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal dropped by approximately 50% year-on-year during the first two months of 2024, while trade traffic around the Cape of Good Hope surged by about 74%. Furthermore, average delivery times for many shipments increased by more than ten days; thus, the true weapon at the Bab al-Mandab Strait is not merely the missile or the drone, but the shipping company’s decision to forgo the passage.

From Bab al-Mandab to the Suez Canal… How does the crisis spread?

The impact begins with the vessel but extends far beyond the sea; when a tanker or container ship avoids the Bab al-Mandab Strait, it requires an alternative route. For voyages between Asia and Europe, this often means sailing around the Cape of Good Hope instead of passing through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The result is an increase in distance, travel time, fuel consumption, and costs related to crew, insurance, and vessel chartering. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have previously documented that shipping disruptions in the Red Sea are not limited to shipping companies alone but extend to regional trade, supply chains, and economic activity across Europe and the Middle East. In this context, the Suez Canal becomes a direct part of the Houthi equation, even if the group never fires a single shot at the canal itself.

The Suez Canal Faces a New Equation

The sensitivity of the situation for Egypt lies in the fact that the Bab al-Mandab Strait serves as the southern gateway to the maritime route connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and subsequently to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Consequently, any sustained disruption at Bab al-Mandab could diminish the appeal of the Suez Canal route for certain shipping lines, even if the canal itself remains open and secure. The 2024 crisis demonstrated that this scenario is far from merely theoretical; as Red Sea traffic declined, shipping companies diverted vessels via the Cape of Good Hope—extending voyage times and driving up costs, with significant repercussions for global trade. A World Bank study indicates that a prolonged Red Sea crisis would have stifled maritime trade growth for countries in the region and the European Union, whereas resolving the crisis would have yielded tangible gains in maritime import and export volumes.

Saudi Arabia: Why have concerns become more direct?

The recent Houthi development coincides with a broader crisis regarding oil export routes from the Gulf; following disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia increasingly relied on the western route—exporting oil via the Red Sea—making the Bab al-Mandab Strait a strategically valuable alternative. However, the Houthi advance toward the strait undermines this alternative.

The Associated Press reports that Saudi oil exports shipped via the Red Sea fell from approximately 3.8 million barrels per day in August to 2.2 million barrels per day, according to International Energy Agency data; meanwhile, Reuters reported that the Saudi East-West Pipeline had been transporting about 4 to 5 million barrels per day—equivalent to roughly 4–5% of global supplies—prior to an attack that caused a temporary shutdown. Thus, two chokepoints converge: Hormuz in the east and Bab al-Mandab in the southwest.

“The alternative route” turns into a new problem.

Saudi Arabia had utilized the infrastructure transporting oil to the Red Sea coast as a means to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reach Asian markets; however, as navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait becomes increasingly perilous, this very alternative is now at risk. Shipping data cited by the AP reveals the irony of the situation: some Saudi oil destined for Asia via the Red Sea is now forced to take longer routes, with shipments to South Korea via the alternative path potentially taking over 54 days instead of the usual 24. Here, geography translates into a direct financial cost.

Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab: Two Straits in a Single Battle

The most critical aspect of this recent development is that it is not occurring in a vacuum; the Strait of Hormuz serves as a vital outlet for energy exports from the Gulf, while the Bab al-Mandab Strait acts as the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the shortest route between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. When both chokepoints face simultaneous disruption, companies and governments confront a radically different scenario: there is no single alternative route capable of simply absorbing the entire volume of traffic that previously flowed through these two passages. Consequently, international reports have linked the Houthi advance at Bab al-Mandab to broader pressures on oil markets, particularly as crude prices have surpassed the $100-per-barrel mark during the current wave of escalation.

What has changed in the Houthi strategy?

The most significant development is not the capture of any specific city, but rather the shift from merely threatening navigation from land to encroaching upon the geography that controls maritime traffic—a move that grants the Houthis greater leverage for negotiation and pressure. Even if the Bab al-Mandab Strait is not formally closed, the mere prospect of an expanding threat could prompt shipping and insurance companies to classify the region as high-risk. The Associated Press (AP) notes that Red Sea traffic remains approximately 60% below pre-attack levels—referring to the wave of attacks that began in late 2023—demonstrating that the impact of the threat persists even when the waterway is not officially shut down.

Iran and the Bab al-Mandab: Strategic Value Beyond Yemen

The Houthi advance grants Iran—linked to the group politically and militarily according to international sources, despite Tehran denying direct command—an additional card in the broader struggle over energy routes. Reuters reported that sources indicated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard provided direct guidance for the recent Houthi advance, with reports also citing increased support, funding, and weaponry, even as Iran denies the group acts as its proxy. Should the Houthis succeed in consolidating their new positions, the strategic value of the Bab al-Mandab Strait in Iranian calculations would extend beyond Yemen to encompass the ability to exert pressure on an alternative route to the Strait of Hormuz. This highlights the location’s significance: two straits flanking the Arabian Peninsula that can influence the very flow of energy and trade between the Gulf and global markets.

Can the Houthis hold onto their gains?

Rapidly seizing control is one thing, but turning that into a permanent military reality is quite another. Yemeni government forces have announced their intention to retake lost territories, while Reuters reports that Saudi-backed forces are preparing a counter-offensive to reclaim Mocha, as well as the lost areas and islands. Consequently, the upcoming battle may not center on reaching the Bab al-Mandab Strait but rather on the ability to secure a lasting foothold there. The longer the Houthis maintain their positions along the coast and on the islands, the greater the value of that control becomes for them—transforming it from a quick operational gain into a strategic asset that cannot be ignored.

Impact on Global Trade: Why Is the World Paying the Price for a Local Battle?

In its study of the Red Sea crisis, the World Bank concluded that the ongoing disruption impacts trade for countries in the region and the European Union, while International Monetary Fund data indicates that shipping companies were already compelled to reroute during the earlier phase of the crisis. This mechanism operates in several stages: a security threat leads to higher insurance risks, necessitating ship rerouting, which extends voyage times and drives up fuel and shipping costs, ultimately resulting in higher prices for goods and energy. Thus, the impact of controlling a small geographical point in Yemen can manifest in economic indicators thousands of kilometers away.

The greatest danger is not the closure of Bab al-Mandab.

The irony is that the most dangerous scenario might not be a formal announcement closing the strait; an official closure decision could trigger a direct and unequivocal international military response. In contrast, a “gray-zone” situation presents greater complexity: partial passage, threats against specific vessels, soaring insurance costs, security warnings, and the gradual rerouting of shipping lanes. Under these conditions, pressure on trade could persist without an explicit “blockade” ever being declared. This is precisely the strategic geographical advantage the Houthis gained by establishing a presence in Mayun, Dhubab, and Mocha.

From a Small Island to the Suez Canal

Ultimately, the significance of Mayon lies not in the island itself, but in its position within a larger network: Mayon → Bab al-Mandab → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean → Europe. Each link in this chain depends on the security of the preceding one. Consequently, Houthi control over new positions in the southern Red Sea does not automatically mean the Suez Canal faces a direct military threat; rather, it means the security environment of the route leading to it has become more fragile. Previous shipping crises have demonstrated that this fragility alone is enough to alter global shipping routes and trade patterns.

The Houthis do not need to close the door.

The new equation in Yemen is not necessarily that the Houthis intend to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait; rather, the crucial point is that they have positioned themselves to potentially drive up the cost of passage through it—a significant strategic distinction. If the Houthis succeed in consolidating their presence around Mocha, Dhubab, and Perim (Mayun) while the threat to navigation persists, control over these points could effectively become a pressure valve for one of the most vital trade routes between Asia and Europe. In that scenario, the conflict would not remain confined to Yemen; its repercussions would extend to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and global markets for oil, insurance, shipping, and supply chains. Consequently, following the recent Houthi advances, the real question is not whether the Houthis can close the Bab al-Mandab Strait, but whether they can compel the world to act as though it were closed.