Sudan is currently experiencing one of its most complex crises since independence. The ongoing war, which began in 2013, is intertwined with political and security power struggles, most notably the attempts by Sudanese Islamists to regain prominence after years of decline. They are using the current conflict as a platform to reassert their influence within the state.
Since the fall of former President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the political Islamist movement has remained one of the most significant sources of tension in the country. Despite the regime’s collapse, Islamists maintained their influence through deep state networks. They gradually returned to the political scene after the 2021 coup, before actively participating in the 2023 war alongside the army, viewing it as a gateway to regaining political, security, and economic power.
Islamists and the bet on prolonging the war
Observers believe that the Islamists’ strategy for survival hinges on two key figures: Ali Karti and Ahmed Haroun. They clearly intend to prolong the war to achieve political gains.
Sudanese political analyst Osama Abdel-Majid Boub told “Sawt Al-Emarat” that the army’s alliance with the Islamist movement since the 1989 coup established a vast network of influence within state institutions. These networks remained active even after the September 2019 revolution, despite the formation of the Empowerment Removal Committee. However, the October 25, 2021 coup froze the committee’s work, paving the way for the Islamists’ return.
Bob adds that Islamists exploited the outbreak of the 2023 war to integrate themselves into the army’s efforts. Ideological formations emerged, such as the reorganization of the Popular Defense Forces and the establishment of the “Al-Bara’ bin Malik” Brigades within the “Popular Resistance” alliance. These formations were pushed forward by the Islamist movement to strengthen its position within the conflict.
Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, is considered the chief architect of their return project. He has been under US sanctions since 2019 for allegedly undermining the democratic transition. Ahmed Haroun, for his part, has publicly advocated a vision based on “military supremacy” and postponing civilian rule, while acknowledging the Islamists’ role in providing military and organizational support.
Is it possible to remove Islamists from the scene?
For his part, Sudanese political researcher Dr. Omar Mustafa Shirkian says that Islamist influence has extended within the security, judicial, economic, and media apparatuses for more than three decades. They use various means to eliminate opponents, ranging from assassinating dissidents and buying loyalties to imposing social and economic restrictions.
Shirkian believes that countering this influence requires a comprehensive political program aimed at national reconciliation, alongside effective diplomatic efforts and an intellectual confrontation that refutes the religious rhetoric used to justify the continued dominance of the Islamist movement. He also emphasizes the need to dismantle the political parties established by the movement as its social and political arms.
According to Osama Boub, Islamists are currently the primary drivers of the ongoing war. He suggests that a ceasefire and the initiation of a transitional process could spell the end of their political project, especially given the widespread popular, regional, and international rejection of their return.
Bob urges the international community to include safeguards in any path toward a solution or a ceasefire that prevent Islamists from participating in the transitional phase, given the political, economic, and social crises their regime has caused since 1989, for which the Sudanese people have paid the price.
