He who has time has the missile… How did Iran’s war turn into a race between factories?

Abu Dhabi, UAE – The equation of Iran’s missile power is no longer measured solely by the number of missiles that survived US and Israeli strikes; recent developments have revealed that Tehran has begun to restore part of its ballistic missile production capability, albeit in limited quantities. According to a *Wall Street Journal* report cited by Reuters, Iran has resumed assembling ballistic missiles using components stockpiled prior to the war within underground facilities, while work continues on new, more heavily fortified sites.

Assembly operations encompass both solid- and liquid-fueled missiles, albeit at rates below pre-war levels. The crucial takeaway here is not that Iran has fully “rebuilt its arsenal”—a conclusion unsupported by available data—but rather that the strikes targeting its missile infrastructure did not eliminate Tehran’s capacity to regenerate its missile capabilities.

Iran rebuilds missiles from “stockpiles,” not from scratch.

The limited resumption of production reveals a distinct phase in the rebuilding of Iranian military capabilities; rather than waiting for all traditional production lines to restart, Tehran can leverage existing components—such as airframes, guidance systems, and certain munitions—and reassemble them in underground facilities. This approach reduces the time required to resume production and enables the conversion of remaining industrial stockpiles into usable missiles, even if key facilities are subjected to strikes.

A recent study by the Middle East Institute indicates that the fundamental post-war problem is not merely the size of the remaining stockpile but rather Iran’s possession of the expertise, infrastructure, and motivation required to rebuild its capabilities. The study also notes that estimating current production capacity remains difficult due to the program’s dispersed and secretive nature.

Why is destroying the missile factory no longer sufficient?

For years, a primary objective of Israeli and U.S. strikes has been to degrade the industrial infrastructure that produces missiles; however, the nature of Iran’s program complicates this task. Iran has developed a network comprising underground production and storage facilities, dispersed sites, dual-use installations, and mobile launchers. Consequently, destroying a building or a tunnel entrance does not necessarily eliminate the capability housed within.

A study by the Middle East Institute indicates that the mobile nature of Iranian missiles and the distributed nature of their industrial infrastructure make monitoring production far more difficult than monitoring a program reliant on a single, centralized facility. Here, the rules of engagement shift: the factory that might be destroyed in one instance may not be the same one that needs to be targeted in the next round.

From Inventory to “Replenishment Capability”

The most significant shift regarding the conflict involving Iran is the move from the question “How many missiles does Iran possess?” to a more critical one: “How many missiles can Iran replenish within a specific timeframe?” This distinction is fundamental; even if Iran’s stockpile is significantly depleted, the ability to remanufacture missiles, repair launch platforms, and restore command-and-control networks affords Tehran the opportunity to regain a level of offensive capability following each round of strikes.

US studies conducted during previous cessations of hostilities have documented Iranian attempts to rebuild military capabilities—including repairing launch platforms and restoring elements of operational infrastructure. Consequently, the hiatus between two rounds of military conflict does not necessarily signify a reduction in the threat; it can instead become a period for regenerating military power.

The figure that reveals the scale of the problem

A study by the Middle East Institute offers a significant indicator of the pace of Iranian reconstruction; it suggests that, between the June 2025 war and the subsequent conflict, Iran managed to replenish its arsenal by approximately 1,000 missiles—implying an estimated production rate of 100 to 125 missiles per month during that period.

However, the study itself emphasizes that these figures are estimates and that there is currently no reliable public data specifying Iran’s production rate following the recent strikes. This implies that talk of a “production comeback” does not equate to a return to previous output levels; rather, it indicates that the reconstruction process has not come to a complete halt.

Solid fuel… the most critical hurdle in rebuilding the arsenal.

Not all missiles are equally difficult to reproduce; Iran’s increasing shift toward solid-fuel missiles renders the production aspect particularly sensitive, as this type offers faster preparation and launch times compared to liquid-fueled missiles. A study by the Middle East Institute notes that solid-fuel production requires specialized materials and equipment—including industrial mixers used to manufacture composite propellant—making this stage of the production chain a crucial indicator for understanding Iran’s capacity to rebuild its arsenal. Consequently, monitoring missile factories alone is insufficient; the most telling indicators may lie in the materials, equipment, and supply chains that precede the missile itself.

The Race of Factories: The United States Faces a Different Equation

On the other hand, the United States does not wage war based solely on the logic of “how many Iranian missiles can be destroyed?” There is a second equation involving the stockpiles of interceptor missiles and air-defense munitions. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that modern warfare imposes what might be termed a “salvo competition,” wherein the production rates of missiles and drones—balanced against the replenishment rates of air-defense and interceptor systems—become a fundamental factor in determining the outcome of the war.

Herein lies the paradox: while the United States might succeed in intercepting a high percentage of Iranian missiles, the continuation of the war raises another question regarding the ability of defense systems to replenish the interceptors that have been expended. Consequently, the conflict becomes a contest between two production lines: an Iranian line striving to rebuild offensive capabilities and a US-Western line attempting to maintain defensive and interception capabilities.

Iran does not need to restore its entire arsenal to change the equation.

Returning to pre-war levels is not a prerequisite for Iran to regain a measure of its deterrence capability; it suffices to possess a stockpile of missiles, launchers, and command networks capable of compelling an adversary to maintain substantial defensive capabilities and allocate vast resources to protect bases, facilities, and infrastructure. This is precisely why “reconstitution capability” is more significant than the total number of missiles at any given moment. An IISS study indicates that pre-war estimates placed Iran’s ballistic missile production capacity at approximately 50 missiles per month—a rate noted to be insufficient to meet Iran’s needs should missile launches continue at high intensity. However, more recent estimates—such as those from the Middle East Institute—suggest that production could, at times, reach significantly higher levels. The very disparity among these estimates reflects the difficulty of accurately gauging Iran’s true capabilities, given the existence of clandestine facilities and industrial dispersion.

Why have tunnels become part of the production strategy?

Moving production underground is not merely a means of protecting personnel and equipment from air raids; it is an attempt to alter the strategic equation itself. An exposed facility is far easier to target, whereas a facility situated within a tunnel network or underground requires precise intelligence to pinpoint its location and function; furthermore, destroying the entrance does not necessarily mean destroying the capabilities housed deep within. This explains the *Wall Street Journal* report regarding the construction of new underground assembly sites, alongside the resumption of limited production using pre-existing components.

The next war might begin in factories rather than on the front lines.

If the confrontation persists, a primary target for both sides will be not merely launch platforms or missile depots, but the adversary’s industrial timeline. Every additional day of truce or pause granted to Iran could mean repairing a launcher, restoring a production line, relocating components, or readying an alternative facility. Conversely, every day of combat entails the consumption of American and Western interceptors and munitions, thereby increasing the need to replenish stockpiles. Consequently, “pauses” are no longer merely political interludes between rounds of warfare; they have become an integral part of the military calculus itself.

He who possesses time possesses the missile.

The new equation does not imply that Iran can rebuild its missile power without limit, nor that US and Israeli strikes failed to weaken its program. Rather, the conflict has demonstrated the difficulty of translating physical damage into the permanent elimination of capabilities. While arsenals can be depleted, facilities struck, and production lines disrupted, the possession of expertise, components, a distributed infrastructure, and alternative facilities enables the program to gradually recover. Thus, the conflict shifts from a confrontation between missiles and aircraft to a contest between the capacity for destruction and the capacity for reconstitution.

In this equation, the victor is not necessarily the party holding the largest stockpile, but rather the one capable of rebuilding its strength faster than its adversary can deplete it. This is why Iran’s resumption of limited missile production—despite strikes on its military infrastructure—carries significance that extends beyond the mere number of missiles rolling off assembly lines: the battle has shifted from the destruction of missile capabilities to a test of each side’s ability to regenerate the capacity to wage war itself.